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Moneyball on Ice?
John Chayka of the Arizona Coyotes is the youngest General Manager in NHL history.
Photo courtesy of ESPN.com.
Cal McKinney ‘20
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The growth of hockey analytics has been 
slow and hesitant. Hockey, like most sports, 
has always relied on some form of statis­
tical data to categorize and file players. 
These conventional measurements are not 
intuitively appealing, and provide scouts 
with a base of understanding before eval­
uating a player based on in-game scouting. 
The core of these measurements are what 
we usually think about when we mention 
a player’s stats: points (goals plus assists), 
plus-minus, time on ice, and hits. Howev­
er appealing these may be to your average 
fan or fantasy manager, they do not reflect 
the entirety of a player’s performance. 
The emerging advanced statistics make 
an attempt to portray an individual’s per­
formance on a multitude of levels. While 
scouts and managers should invest in the 
use of advanced analytics, they should 
be used in conjunction with conventional 
scouting methods, and mostly as a point of 
comparison between players on the same 
team.
The rise of advanced statistics in sports 
is often credited to Billy Beane of the Oak­
land A’s in the MLB, seen in the now-fa- 
mous book Moneyball, written by Michael 
Lewis, which was later adapted into a film 
of the same title. Beane took a statistical 
approach to scouting as a way of cutting
costs and maximizing output at the same 
time. In hockey, as in baseball, analytics 
can be used to find the bargain players. In 
this case, it is mostly functional in filling 
out a team’s bottom six forwards and fifth 
and sixth defenseman. Elite talent, as I will 
show later, does not always translate to 
the best ratings in advanced stats. Earlier 
this year, the Arizona Coyotes hired a 26 
year old analytics guru, John Chayka, to be 
their general manager.1 Every NHL team 
has now invested in a statistics department, 
but the Coyotes’ hire is a step beyond that. 
Hockey analytics continues to grow, de­
spite negative pressure. Critics contend 
that luck is too prominent in hockey to trust 
statistical analysis. While it is true that luck 
is a factor in hockey, it affects every skater, 
making it essentially negligible when com­
paring player performance.
The groundbreaking metric in the world 
of hockey analytics, and the one most fre­
quently referred to today in blogs and arti­
cles, is the Corsi metric. Corsi is a simple 
measurement of shots attempts for versus 
shot attempts against while a given player 
is on the ice.2 Included in this shot mea­
surement, which is often calculated as a 
rate per sixty minutes or a gross sum, are 
shots on goal, blocked shots, and missed 
shots. The Corsi stat is often thought of as 
a possession stat for teams and individual 
players, since shots are highly correlated
with puck possession and offensive zone 
time. The results of the 2015-16 NHL sea­
son show when Corsi is useful, and where 
it falls short.
The NHL has recently added advanced 
stats to the measurements available on their 
website. I will be referring to their infor­
mation for the purposes of analyzing the 
effectiveness of these metrics in evaluating 
player and team performance. The NHL’s 
website measures shot attempts as a dif­
ferential of shot attempts for versus shot 
attempts against. This is, in effect, Corsi. 
The league MVP last season, Patrick Kane, 
ranks 140th in the league in this category.3 
Based on this it is clear that Corsi is not 
a significant criteria in electing the league 
MVP. The leader in individual Corsi was 
Drew Doughty, with a differential of plus 
537.4 Rounding out the top ten in the league 
are six of Doughty’s LA Kings teammates. 
This indicates that individual Corsi rating 
is highly correlated to team Corsi rating. 
Unsurprisingly, Los Angeles also leads the 
league in team Corsi percentage.5 I do not 
mean to discredit Drew Doughty, or the 
Los Angeles Kings for that matter. Dough­
ty was among the best, if not the best de­
fenseman in the league this past season. He 
did, in the end, win the Norris Trophy for 
best NHL defenseman. His team, howev­
er, did end up being eliminated in the first 
round of the playoffs to the Stanley Cup fi-
4 Sports, Inc.
nalist San Jose Sharks.
Looking at Corsi ratings can be helpful, 
but it cannot be used in isolation. Teams of­
ten look at a multitude of measurements, 
often compiling them into their own formu­
la forjudging player performance based on 
advanced analytics. In the case of Corsi, it 
is also important to consider shooting per­
centage because, in the end, shots are far 
more indicative of performance if they are 
going in the goal. Shot percentage mea­
sures show a far different result than Corsi. 
Shot percentage measures the percent of a 
team’s shots going in the goal while an in­
dividual is on the ice. The highest ranked 
Los Angeles King in this measure is Anze 
Kopitar at number forty-eight, with a shot 
percentage 9.48%.6 Clearly the King’s em­
ploy a shoot-first mentality. As a result, 
they take more shots, with less actually go­
ing in. Due to their system, players have an 
inflated Corsi rating, which can be mislead­
ing when comparing them to players on 
other teams. The system a team employs, 
and their overall success over the course 
of the season, can either inflate or deflate 
an individual’s advanced statistics. For this 
reason, it is important to analyze these sta­
tistics relative to the team a player is on, 
first and foremost. Comparing a player on 
the Los Angeles Kings to a player on the 
Colorado Avalanche in 2015-16, the worst 
Corsi team that year, shows very little. No 
player on Colorado who played greater than 
forty games had a shot attempts differential 
better than negative 100.7 Comparatively, 
no Los Angeles player who played greater 
than forty games had a shot attempts dif­
ferential below zero.8 The consideration of 
shot percentage to adjust Corsi is just a mi­
nor example of the far more complex data 
formulas being used by NHL clubs.
Despite these critiques of Corsi, it still 
offers managers, scouts, and coaches 
valuable information on top of traditional 
scouting. As a team statistic, Corsi is prov­
en to be highly correlated with winning, 
exemplified by the fact that in 2015-16, the 
top nine teams in Corsi percentage all went 
on to make the playoffs.9 On the individual 
level, it can be used by scouts and coaches 
to assess a player, and determine whether 
or not they are succeeding with regards to 
possession. Oftentimes, players are given 
statistical information about their games in 
addition to watching film as a developmen­
tal tool. For managers looking to assess tal­
ent, Corsi is useful in conjunction with oth­
er measures. Yet, Corsi I 
alone does not point 
out which players are 
elite. This requires a 
fuller understanding of 
players and their game. 
For instance, Sidney 
Crosby is almost cer­
tainly the most domi­
nant player currently, 
as he is coming off
MVP performances. 
However, his Corsi 
ratings are nothing to
the Penguins last year,
Crosby ranks fifth on 
the team with a Corsi 
percentage of 54.5%.10 
These numbers are 
good, but not elite pos­
session numbers. So, while certain players 
may exceed others in their Corsi ratings, 
all other factors, such as team system, line- 
mates, and shot quality, must be taken into 
consideration.
Many of my critiques have touched on 
why hockey has been slower than baseball 
to embrace analytics. Chief among these 
reasons is the nature of the two games. 
Far fewer isolated events occur in hockey 
than in baseball. For instance, pitchers deal 
with relatively consistent circumstances 
compared to a hockey player shooting the 
puck. The same goes for a baseball hit­
ter. The lack of isolated events in hockey 
make it far more difficult to judge talent 
solely based off of statistics. This is why 
conventional methods of scouting should 
be used along with advanced statistics. 
Furthermore, where hockey teams really 
save money is in their bottom six forwards. 
These are players who are paid roughly 
the same across the league, but for whom 
possession is a critical factor of the game. 
Scoring is coming predominantly from the 
top six forwards, so a bottom six that can 
control possession and keep the other team 
from scoring is essential to succeed.
The NHL currently stands at a cross­
roads. While every team has invested to 
some extent in analytics, some, like the Ar­
izona Coyotes, are embracing it fully, while 
others remain skeptical. All in all, any ad­
vancement in the way we analyze and look
Player Season Team Pos GP SATFor
SAT
Agst SATj
1 D r e w  Doug h t y 2015-16 LAK D 82 1778 1241 537
2 M i l a n  L u cic 2015-16 LAK L 81 1337 915 422
3 J ake M u z z i n 2015-16 LAK D 82 1558 1154 404
4 T y l e r  T o f f o l i 2015-16 LAK C 82 1260 862 398
5 Bra y d e n  M c N a b b 2015-16 LAK D 81 1399 1010 389
6 Hampus L i n d h o l m 2015-16 A N A D 80 1360 1014 346
7 A n z e  Kop i t a r 2015-16 LAK C 81 1273 941 332
8 V i c t o r  Hed m a n 2015-16 TBL D 78 1394 1062 332
9 D u s t i n  Bro w n 2015-16 LAK R 82 1148 822 326
10 J ohn K l i n g b e r g 2015-16 DAL D 76 1578 1258 320
11 N i c k  Shore 2015-16 LAK C 68 807 509 298
12 Tomas H e rtl 2015-16 SJS C 81 1181 908 273
13 M i k e  Rib e i r o 2015-16 NSH c 81 1153 881 272
14 F i l i p  F o r s b e r g 2015-16 NSH L 82 1203 933 270
15 P a t r i c  H o r n q v i s t 2015-16 PIT R 82 1182 919 263
The LA Kings dominated the league last year in shot attempt metrics.
Data courtesy of NHL.com 
at the game is positive. Analytics has the 
ability to enhance the fan experience, and 
add a whole new dimension to the business 
of recruiting talent. Hockey will continue 
to depend on traditional ways of assessing 
talent, with added pressure from millenni- 
als and the next generation of managers to 
take an analytics approach to the game.
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Social Activism of Athletes:
We're Listening
Members of the New York Liberty pictured wearing black pregame apparel in protest of recent shootings
Madeleine Roglich ‘18
•  •
It’s Sunday night, football is on and the 
National Anthem is echoing throughout the 
stadium. Colin Kaepemick is kneeling on 
the sideline of the field. Kaepemick is pro­
testing racial injustice.1 His actions, which 
were noticed at the beginning of Septem­
ber, have led his teammates and many other 
athletes to take a stand alongside him. Al­
though some don’t agree with Kaepemick’s 
actions, calling them pointless or dumb, 
the actions of he and his counterparts have 
been extremely beneficial to the causes 
they stand for, encouraging people to take 
notice to what they are bringing attention 
to and listen.
Recently, it seems that professional 
athletes have become increasingly vocal 
regarding social causes: WNBA players 
wore black pregame shirts in support of 
Black Lives Matter,2 NBA players spoke 
out at the ESPYs regarding positive social 
change as a whole3 and, most recently, ath­
letes from NFL players to NWSL players
have been protesting racial injustice on 
the field.4 At the same time, the publicity 
surrounding athletes and the causes they 
are speaking out on behalf of has also in­
creased. This topic has captured the atten­
tion of the media and made major headlines 
everywhere from NPR to the New York 
Times to The Washington Post. People are 
listening.
As an athlete, one has an intimate follow­
ing of fans both personally and of his/her 
team. This means that an athlete’s words 
have a lot of potential reach and ability to 
make an impact on the millions of people 
who enjoy professional sports. So why not 
use this revered celebrity status to promote 
good and further social causes? Whether 
or not people agree with what athletes are 
saying, it is undeniable that they are bring­
ing plenty of attention to these causes. As 
stated by Travis Waldron of ThinkProgress, 
“Unlike many ‘ordinary’ people, [athletes] 
stand on a platform that gives them major 
influence in American culture.”5 When 
athletes take stands, people notice. They
Photo courtesy of the Associated Press, 
are on a huge stage with millions of peo­
ple watching, meaning they can make a 
vast impact and increase the awareness of 
many more people. Historically, social ac­
tivist athletes have successfully made pos­
itive impacts on the causes that they have 
stood for, from Muhammad Ali to Kareem 
Abdul-Jabbar.6 For example, Muhammad 
Ali’s refusal to be drafted into the armed 
forces in 1967 conveyed a strong sense of 
opposition for the Vietnam War. Ali was a 
pioneer of the anti-war movement, and “in 
the three years he didn’t fight, [he] became 
a prominent” anti-war movement speaker 
and leader with many people looking up to 
him and listening.7 More recently, Kareem 
Abdul-Jabbar penned the book, Writings on 
the Wall, which is about “racism and police 
brutality and how best to approach these 
important issues.”8 He is using his athletic 
greatness to try to educate others. Ali and 
Abdul-Jabbar, in addition to other athlete 
activists, have spoken out against social is­
sues, which have shown the public that the 
problems they face are noticed by everyone
6 Sports, Inc.
“Regardless of 
whether people view 
outspoken social 
activist athletes as 
positive or negative, it 
is undeniable that the 
attention and 
awareness they are 
drawing to these topics 
has been beneficial.”
and need to be addressed. People listened.
Sometimes athletes who speak out for 
social causes can generate full-fledged 
support and other times they can gener­
ate dissenting opinions that can affect the 
athlete’s career. In an interview done with 
Chris Kluwe, a former Minnesota Vikings 
punter who strongly advocated for mar­
riage equality, he asserts that a large reason 
why all athletes don’t speak out on behalf 
of causes they believe in is because of fear 
of risking their jobs.9 Kluwe believes that 
his activism is a reason why the Minnesota 
Vikings decided to cut him. Thus, if this is 
true, there is a clear tradeoff that athletes 
must weigh, in whether or not they want 
to risk their job security for “[bringing] 
attention to something that’s important”; 
there are “perils [that] activism can have 
for athletes who choose to speak out on is­
sues that may cause controversy with team­
mates, coaches, and fans alike.”10 “Because 
professional sports are such a cutthroat 
world, rocking that politically-averse boat 
is an easy way to give teams another reason 
to move on to someone else who doesn’t 
come with the public relations headache. 
When the perception that engaging on a 
controversial issue can jeopardize your 
job, as it is with Kluwe now, staying mum 
is easy.”11 It is clearly not always easy for 
athletes to speak up, but when they do we 
listen.
Although there are clear potential barri­
ers that dissuade all athletes from speaking 
out for social causes, athletes that do are 
making an impact. Regardless of whether 
people view outspoken social activist ath­
letes as positive or negative, it is undeni­
able that the attention and awareness they 
are drawing to these topics has been ben­
eficial. The activism of these athletes is 
educating people who “may not know and 
understand” what is going on surrounding 
the issues that they are bringing attention 
to.12 The actions of athletes such as Colin 
Kaepemick “got attention and got a con­
versation going”.13 The effect of athletes’ 
social activism has thus been focusing their 
spotlight on these social issues of concern 
to them and directing the publics’ eye to 
these issues. Social activist athletes may 
not be the rabble-rousers capable of getting 
people to act, but they certainly get people 
to think. And although we don’t typically 
see these athletes acting for these causes at 
public events beyond sports arenas, who 
knows, maybe we will soon see them on 
the streets alongside protestors. Athletes 
are taking a stand and we are listening.
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A Juiceless Proposal
Daniel Solomon ‘19
If it were possible to earn an extra $10 
million by taking non-addictive, non-life 
threatening drugs, would someone do it? 
What if that number were $25 million? Or 
even $50 million? If that someone is a pro­
fessional baseball player, the answer would 
be a resounding yes as evidenced by doz­
ens of Major League Baseball players who 
have been caught cheating via the league­
wide perfonnance enhancing drug (PED) 
tests. The current penalty—an eighty game 
suspension without pay and ineligibility in 
the post season1—is not enough in today’s 
high pay game, with teams averaging $ 1.2 
billion in overall value as of March 2015.2
Players have consistently proven that the 
aforementioned penalty is meaningless. 
Just look at Dee Gordon, Jhonny Peral­
ta, Melky Cabrera, Nelson Cruz, and yes, 
even the beloved David Ortiz and Bartolo 
Colon—all of these players have had pe­
riods of decline, when they were seem­
ingly past their primes or simply fringe 
Major League players. All of these players 
served suspensions for using PEDs, ex­
cept for Ortiz, whose name appeared on 
the list of 2003 failed tests. Yet, combined, 
they have signed contracts worth a total of 
$551,928,877.3 It cannot be known how 
much of their resurgent abilities was from 
drug use or how long they were cheating 
prior to signing their contracts. It is pos­
sible that they could still be using PEDs. 
But what is clear is they have financially 
prospered and continue to reap the benefits 
of a system which incentivizes cheating. 
If baseball truly wants to rid itself of drug 
use, it needs to eliminate the economic in­
centives that exist despite being caught.
The careers of the far more infamous and 
polarizing Barry Bonds, Alex Rodriguez, 
Roger Clemens and Manny Ramirez are 
irrelevant to this discussion, because they 
were likely All Star or even Hall of Fame 
caliber players with or without the use 
of PEDs. Realistically, they would have 
earned massive financial contracts regard­
less of whether or not they cheated. Thus, 
though significant in terms of their Hall of 
Fame arguments and general legacy with­
in the game, their connection to PEDs is
rather unimportant in terms of the financial 
impact of both the current and proposed 
penalty systems.
According to a UC Berkley study, the av­
erage player increase in OPS (on-base per­
centage plus slugging percentage) as a re­
sult of using PEDs is .104 points. In 2005, 
that gap in OPS would equate to approxi­
mately $2 million in extra pay.4 Consider­
ing that the average player salary was just 
over $2.6 million on opening day in 2005 
as compared to the record $4.4 million on 
opening day in 2016—nearly seventy per­
cent higher—that mere $2 million has like­
ly grown considerably.5-6
But the issue is not simply the increase in 
pay that comes from increased production. 
That, after all, occurs in every industry. The 
issue is what happens after the perpetrator 
is caught. The aforementioned Cabrera, in 
the midst of an All Star season when he
under Major League Baseball’s drug pro­
gram.”8 Despite these actions, Cabrera was 
still rewarded with a two year, $16 million 
contract immediately following his tainted 
season (he has also since signed another 
three-year, $42 million deal).9 Peralta was 
suspended as a result of the Biogenesis 
scandal, yet he parlayed his steroid aided 
success into a four year, $53 million con­
tract. The apparently ageless wonder Bar­
tolo Colon pitched in a combined 48 games 
from 2006 to 2009 before being completely 
out of baseball for the 2010 season, then 
suddenly became a model of durability, 
starting a minimum of 25 games a season 
in the six years since his return.10 Dee Gor­
don, a player who could barely maintain a 
batting average above .200 until 2014, not 
only was suspended a few short months 
after signing a five year, $50 million ex­
tension but is entitled to the remainder of
failed his drug test, 
had been released by 
the Braves just two 
years prior to being 
suspended.7 Accord­
ing to OPS+, a statis­
tic which measures a 
player’s batting per­
formance compared 
to the league average 
of 100, he had never 
had an above average 
offensive season prior 
to his release, topping 
out at five percent 
worse than league av­
erage. Yet, suddenly, 
Cabrera became an 
above average, if not 
elite, offensive play­
er, with an OPS+ of 
157 in the year he got 
caught. In addition to 
cheating, he attract­
ed the attention of 
federal investigators 
when he “created a 
fictitious website and 
a nonexistent product 
designed to prove he 
inadvertently took the 
banned substance that 
caused a positive test
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New York Daily News cover reveals Cabrera's attempts to trick Major 
League Baseball and avoid his suspension.
Photo courtesy of NY Daily News
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his salary regardless of future performance. 
His batting average dropped from a league 
leading .333 in the year before his suspen­
sion to just .268 this season. According to 
OPS+, his offensive production has slipped 
from 16 percent above league average to 24 
percent below it." And the industry praises 
David Ortiz as a future Hall of Famer, yet 
he couldn’t surpass 20 home runs until his 
age 27 season, which is coincidently the 
same year as his failed test.12 This is where 
the fault lies. There is no incentive not to 
cheat. Players will get their money anyway. 
And teams do not seem to shy away from 
hiring drug-aided players.
But what if the system contained a 
disincentive for getting caught rather than 
incentivizing cheating?
“If baseball truly wants 
to rid itself of drug use, it 
needs to eliminate the eco­
nomic incentives that exist 
despite being caught.”
Major League Baseball should add in a 
clause to every contract allowing the team 
to terminate the deal and resign the player— 
who has been caught and suspended for use 
of performance enhancing drugs—to up to 
three years at the major league minimum 
salary, an admittedly radical proposition 
with little if any chance of players’ union 
ratification. But if baseball is truly serious 
in its efforts to rid the game of drug use, it 
needs to hit the players in their wallets.
The guaranteed nature of baseball con­
tracts causes the team to bear the financial 
risk of underperformance. Assuming a 
player is clean, the club would be in a fair 
position with the player when determining 
if and how much it is willing to pay for 
that player’s services. However, if a play­
er is caught cheating, the club has no out. 
Installing a clause to rework or terminate 
a contract as a result of a drug related sus­
pension would cause the player to bear the 
financial risk of cheating.13
Baseball would not be the first sport 
to make regular use of non-guaranteed 
contracts. After all, football is notorious 
for handing out such deals, and its players 
have both shorter careers and greater risk 
for life-altering injuries than baseball play­
ers. Additionally, despite football being the
most popular and profitable of the four ma­
jor American sports, football players make 
the least money, on average, while base­
ball players earn the second highest aver­
age salaries (only NBA players earn more 
than MLB players).14 And teams would be 
unable to void based on injury, subpar per­
formance, character issues or age; only a 
suspension for getting caught using PEDs 
would be a valid reason to terminate and 
restructure a player’s contract.
Even with such a clause, baseball will 
never become football, where teams seem­
ingly sign players to massive contracts 
without ever intending to pay them the 
full amount—in 2013 Ben Roethlisberg- 
er became the first player ever to earn at 
least $70 million of a $100 million NFL 
contract, at which point four MLB play­
ers had signed guaranteed contracts worth 
double the full amount of the deal. Albert 
Pujols is a clear example of a player who 
has not played to the level of his pay—his 
OPS+ has dropped from an average of 170 
in the eleven years preceding his contract, 
compared to just 123 since15—yet, under 
this proposed system, he would still get the 
remaining money on his $240 million free 
agent deal.16
Players have been vocal about their 
desire to clean up the game. Mike Trout, 
commonly regarded as the best player in 
the game, stated: “I think you should be out 
of the game if you get caught.” As recent­
ly as 2013, Josh Hamilton estimated that 
“95 percent of the guys in the league” want 
stricter penalties for PED use.17 Assum­
ing that this is even remotely true, there is 
no reason not to rethink the penalties for 
cheating.
It’s time for baseball to consider this 
proposal.
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Beyond
Nike:
The Peculiar 
Cases of 
Novak 
Djokovic 
and Stephen 
Curry
Daniel Kozek ‘20
Just Do It.
It was not long ago that the Nike brand 
equated to excellence in the world of pro­
fessional sports. Nowhere more evident 
than in the NBA and on the ATP tour, to 
don the iconic swoosh logo out on the 
court signified the attainment of a degree 
of greatness only matched by a select few. 
From Kobe Bryant to Roger Federer, and 
LeBron James to Rafael Nadal, it seemed 
to many that the secret to athletic achieve­
ment could be obtained through the acqui­
sition of the Oregon-born apparel.
However, the notion of Nike elitism 
has since been shattered thanks by and 
large to the recent emergence of two super- 
stars. Playing under different brand names 
are Novak Djokovic, the ATP’s top-ranked 
Serbian sensation with 12 Grand Slam ti­
tles to his name, and Stephen Curry, the 
NBA’s “baby-faced assassin” who is also 
the league’s two-time reigning MVP. As 
a testament to the brilliance exhibited by 
both players, who are primarily endorsed 
by Uniqlo and Under Armour respectively, 
it has become apparent that the Nike brand 
is no longer the hallmark of success in the 
industry of athletic apparel.
DJOKOVIC
By the time Novak Djokovic won his
Stephen Curry now is endorsed by Under Armour.
Photo courtesy of Under Armour
first major title at the 2008 Australian Open, 
there was but one name worth mentioning 
on the men’s tennis circuit: Roger Federer. 
Having emerged the victor in 10 of the past 
14 Grand Slams, as well as reaching at least 
the semifinals in the remaining 4,' Federer 
was the universally renowned face of ten­
nis. Later, as Djokovic rose to prominence 
in 2011 and began to rival the Swiss super- 
star at the Australian, Wimbledon, and US 
Opens, one major title continued to elude 
them both. This was because between 2005 
and 2014, the clay courts of the French 
Open virtually belonged to one man, and 
one man only: Rafael Nadal. With an un­
precedented record of 66-1 at the Roland 
Garros,2 it seemed to both fans and pun­
dits alike that nobody, not even Federer or 
Djokovic, was any match for the Spaniard 
as the tour traveled to Paris each June.
For many years, Federer and Nadal 
shared the global spotlight, and rightfully 
so. As the top two ranked players on the 
ATP tour consecutively from July 2005 
through August 2009, and with 31 major 
titles between them,3 the greatest rivalry 
in the history of tennis has indisputably 
accounted for much of the success in the 
sport in the early 21st Century. At the same 
time, however, the extensive achievements 
of both men have subliminally indoctrinat­
ed generations of young fans with the mes­
sage of Nike superiority.
It would take the rise of Novak Djokov­
ic to quell this notion. While he may have 
never been affiliated with Nike, Djokovic 
spent the early part of his career affiliated 
solely with Adidas, the only corporation 
in the sphere of athletic apparel that could 
even come close to rivaling Nike. How­
ever, Adidas soon decided to devote the 
majority of its funding for men’s tennis 
to Andy Murray instead. Although he has 
continued to rely on Adidas’ tennis shoes, 
Djokovic turned to alternatives for all of 
his above-ankle needs.
Even with four Grand Slams under his 
belt, Djokovic found himself in the per­
plexing situation in which he was without 
an apparel contract aside from the afore­
mentioned tenuous one with Adidas limit­
ed to shoes. As one of the (if not the) best 
athletes in his field at the time, striking a 
deal with a company that would pay him 
appropriately proved to be a challenge. In 
addition, on account of Djokovic’s loyalty 
to Adidas’ brand of shoe, he was forced to 
seek out an endorsement with a corporation 
that was not one of the German firm’s ma­
jor competitors (also known as Nike).4 
Enter Uniqlo.
Uniqlo, one of Japan’s leading clothing 
manufacturer and retailers, had been virtu­
ally unrecognizable outside of its country 
of origin before the 21st Century despite 
being founded in 1949. But as a result of
10 Sports, Inc.
fast worldwide growth post-2005, they 
were determined to make a monumental 
impression with their entrance into the 
world of sports sponsorships.
The marriage between Djokovic and 
Uniqlo appeared to be a match made in 
heaven. On May 23, 2012, the top-ranked 
tennis superstar entered a five-year deal 
with Uniqlo worth $44 million, along with 
the distinction of being the Japanese cor­
poration’s “global brand ambassador”.5 Fi­
nally, Djokovic had earned the contract he 
long-desired.
Yet, what most are unaware of was just 
how close he had been to coming to terms 
with Nike. In April 2012, it was widely as­
sumed that Djokovic was going to follow 
in the footsteps of his perennial rivals Fed- 
erer and Nadal by joining forces with Nike. 
But in spite of being described as being 
“very close to a contract”6 with the world’s 
largest apparel corporation, the Serbian de­
viated from the road more well-traveled. 
Djokovic’s deal with Uniqlo may have in­
dicated the beginning of the end for Nike’s 
monopoly, but the death of its supremacy 
was far from over.
CURRY
Drafted seventh overall in the 2009 NBA 
Draft, Stephen Curry was never expected 
to become the face of the National Bas­
ketball Association. Today, however, he is 
considered to be “the greatest shooter in 
NBA history” by both players and analysts 
alike.7 Another title he can lay claim to: Ni­
ke’s “one that got away”.
Following the 2013 NBA season, when 
Curry’s rookie deal with Nike reached its 
expiration, the brand had the first shot at 
pitching an offer to the Golden State War­
riors’ starting point guard. Keeping Curry 
under contract should have been a slam 
dunk. He may have only been officially 
partnered with Nike for a few years, but un­
officially he had been endorsing the brand 
for much, much longer. For all intents and 
purposes, Stephen Curry was a Nike athlete 
for life. His godfather worked for Nike, so 
it had always been their sneakers that he 
would lace up whenever he stepped on the 
basketball court, from childhood through 
his college years playing for Davidson. But 
even though Curry had never lost his loyal­
ty to the brand, the feeling was not mutual.
Nike’s pitch meeting was a miserable 
failure. Their first mistake was overlook­
ing Curry when selecting players to lead
their sponsored camps for young emerging 
basketball talent, opting for players such as 
Kyrie Irving and Anthony Davis instead. 
Next, a spokesperson mispronounced the 
now-superstar’s name. And finally, the pre­
pared slideshow that aimed to keep Curry 
under contract bore Kevin Durant’s name 
rather than his own.
Stephen Curry felt insulted, and rightfully 
so. Just like in the college recruitment pro­
cess as well as in the NBA draft, once again 
he was overlooked. And so he moved on 
from Nike and signed with Under Armour. 
At the time, Nike may have not thought 
much of the move, but looking back on 
Curry’s decision, it “probably changed the 
flow of billions of dollars, creating a jet 
stream that takes fortunes out of Oregon, 
and flies the monies to Maryland.”8
Flash forward to March 3, 2016. Ac­
cording to expert analysis of Under Ar­
mour’s business prospects, their deal with 
the NBA’s leading scorer and reigning 
MVP is potentially worth an estimated $14 
billion.9 Thanks to Curry, the company’s 
basketball shoe sales have increased by 
350%, and his signature shoe business has 
grown larger than any other active athlete 
in the game. Bigger than LeBron. Bigger 
than Kobe. Only the great Michael Jordan 
still holds the right to boast that his name is 
bigger than Curry’s.
The Game Has Changed
Nike’s monopoly is no more; they are 
no longer impervious to competition. The 
days when one would require their en­
dorsement before being considered the best 
in one’s respective sport are long gone, and 
a new era of healthy competition has ar­
rived. While many may continue to regard
the Nike brand as one without equal, this 
alone does not warrant exclusive authority 
over the rest of the industry. The corpora­
tion may wield the most power today, but 
similar to how Djokovic and Curry have 
eclipsed their predecessors, so too exists 
the possibility of Nike’s supersession, albe­
it in the distant future.
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The Relationship Between Player Salary 
and Success in Major League Baseball
Harrison Marcus ‘20
Major League Baseball neglects to include 
a salary cap, which on the surface may 
suggest that teams like the Yankees and 
Dodgers with larger financial budgets are 
at a significant advantage over the Indians 
and Royals of the league who don’t play in 
major markets. While this may be true, the 
correlation between player salary and play­
er performance is not nearly as direct as 
the casual fan would expect. Often times, 
players on inexpensive contracts perform 
on par with - if not better than - those who 
earn baseball’s heftier salaries. Both the 
structure of the league and the nature of the 
sport contribute to this pattern. Statistical 
analysis suggests that MLB front offices 
shouldn’t always feel compelled to dish 
out significant cash to free agents; finding 
cheaper solutions - especially with position 
players - is possible and more financially 
efficient for baseball organizations.
WAR, which is an acronym for “wins 
above replacement,” is a sabermetric 
baseball statistic developed to summarize 
a player’s total contributions to his team.
The WAR value for a player is calculated 
by dividing the number of additional wins 
his team achieves by the number of ex­
pected team wins if that player were to be 
substituted by a replacement-level player, 
a player that may be added to the team for 
minimal cost.1 Essentially, it can be used to 
determine how valuable a player is to his 
particular team on the baseball field. Of the 
74 position players who earned over $10 
million in salary in 2015, just 17 of them 
placed in the top 60 in terms of WAR.2 In 
other words, 72% of the top 60 most valu­
able position players in terms of WAR were 
signed for less than $10 million, imposing 
much less of a financial burden on their 
franchises. Whether these players were 
breakout candidates who virtually came 
out of nowhere, underrated veterans who 
never received the recognition they de­
serve, or high prospects finally emerging to 
the majors, this statistic proves there are so 
many cheaper alternatives to finding pro­
ductive hitters.
Furthermore, of the 23 hitters who 
earned over $17 million in salary in 2015, 
just three, a measly three, of them were
within this group of top 60 hitters in terms 
of WAR.3 87% of position players making 
more than $17 million failed to crack the 
list of top 60 most valuable hitters for 2015. 
In what other industry or organization do 
87% of the top paid employees, who are 
considered “superstars” in their respective 
industry, fail to be the most valuable and 
productive, like we see in Major League 
Baseball? The three players who did crack 
the top 60 weren’t even towards the top of 
the list; Miguel Cabrera ranked 23rd, Adri­
an Gonzalez ranked 45th, and Mark Teixei- 
ra ranked 50th.
Most of these players whose baseball 
value didn’t match their financial value 
are either washed up veterans on the back 
end of huge contracts, like Ryan Howard, 
or players whose production simply never 
lived up to expectations following their big 
contracts, like Carl Crawford. This isn’t to 
say that handing out contracts north of a 
$17 million average annual value is always 
bad, but teams should be smarter about 
the whole process. Maybe offer less years 
in the contract so you’re not stuck losing 
money to a player whose prime ended five 
years ago. Maybe spend the money more 
selectively, saving the finances for when 
a transcendent, sure-fire talent becomes 
available on the market. These statistics 
should raise eyebrows to the fact that play­
ers don’t translate their high salary to sig­
nificant production on the baseball field as 
often as one may think.
It is crucial to acknowledge, howev­
er, that pitchers have a much more unique 
correlation between salary and WAR than 
position players do. In 2015, six of the top 
13 pitchers in terms of WAR earned at least 
$17 million. At the same time, five of the 
top 13 earned less than $1 million. We’ve 
seen the value of consistent dominance 
from veteran pitchers on loaded contracts, 
like Max Scherzer and Clayton Kershaw, 
yet we’ve also witnessed young pitching 
prospects emerging and excelling early in 
their careers, like Noah Syndergaard and 
the late Jose Fernandez.
When analyzing the relationship be-
Carl Crawford, who has had a 1.2 Wins Above Replacement since he signed a 7-year, $142 
million contract in 2011.
Photo courtesy ofThe Inquirer
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tween payroll and team success there are 
some surprising statistics that give hope 
to small market franchises. One would 
typically assume that with higher payrolls 
comes more wins and ultimately more 
success in the glorified month of Octo­
ber. However, the stats prove otherwise. 
Of the seven teams that opened the 2015 
baseball campaign with a payroll of $150 
million or higher, just two of them reached 
the postseason. Neither of those two teams, 
the Dodgers nor the Yankees, went on to 
win a playoff series. Furthermore, the 2015 
World Series was played between the Kan­
sas City Royals and New York Mets, who 
placed 16th and 21st in opening day pay­
roll, respectively.4 Spending more means 
winning more? Not so fast.
Of the players who were under base­
ball’s 21 largest individual contracts in 
2015, none of them won a playoff series in 
2015. Zero. This is not necessarily a knock 
to the player, but it goes to show that teams 
that dish out expensive contracts to players 
are by no means guaranteed playoff suc­
cess.
Of course, there are many times in 
which having a higher payroll or signing 
a player to a hefty contract has paid div­
idends for a baseball organization. Think 
of the 2009 World Series Champion Yan­
kees, whose $201 million payroll was $52 
million higher than the next team. Think of 
Miguel Cabrera, who has led the Tigers to 
multiple postseason trips and a World Se­
ries appearance during the past few years. 
He was clearly worth every penny of his 8 
year, $152 million contract that he signed 
in 2008. However, his new 8 year, $248 
million contract has just kicked in this year, 
which makes him a Tiger earning at least 
$30 million per year until he turns 43.5 Will 
a 42-year old Miguel Cabrera be worth $30 
million? The odds are strongly against him. 
Will the years of excellence in the begin­
ning of the contract be worth the years of 
lackluster performance, yet high salary, to­
Statistics prove that the 
relationship between salary 
and performance on the 
field, whether it be at the 
individual or team level, 
is weaker than one would 
expect.”
Ryan Howard, who has had a minus-4 Wins Above Replacement since he signed a 5-year, 
$125 million extension with the Philadelphia Phillies in 2012.
Photo courtesy of The Inquirier
wards the backend of the contract?
Ultimately, Major League Baseball 
franchises will probably continue to dish 
out significant financial assets to players, 
who will likely fail to match the perfor­
mance value that is expected of them. At 
the same time, teams, especially those in 
smaller markets, will continue to exploit 
market deficiencies, finding hidden, cheap 
talents and allocating funds to safer, less 
high profile free agents. Statistics prove 
that the relationship between salary and 
performance on the field, whether it be at 
the individual or team level, is weaker than 
one would expect. The beauty of baseball 
is that every team has a chance to compete, 
even without a salary cap.
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Winonomics:
Small Market Economies and Winning
Franchises
The Cavs celebrate and lift up the trophy as they end Cleveland's 52-year long major professional championship drought.
Photo courtesy of Foxsports.com
Scott Symons ‘19
When thinking of recent championships, 
there is one city that comes to mind im­
mediately but seemingly ironically: Cleve­
land. Preceding the events that transpired 
on June 19, 2016, Game 7 of the NBA 
Finals, Cleveland had not won a major 
professional sports championship since 
1964.1 LeBron James and Kyrie Irving 
ended the city’s 52-year drought in heroic 
fashion, leading the Cavaliers to a come­
back from a 3-1 series deficit against the 
best (record-wise) team in NBA history, 
Stephen Curry’s Golden State Warriors. 
What ensued were days of celebration in 
the streets of Cleveland, countless pictures 
of J.R. Smith without a shirt on, and innu­
merable stories of the sentimental value of 
the championship to the city. One would be 
hard-pressed to find a sports fan that was 
not at least a little bit happy for Cleveland­
ers. More than half a century is a long time!
The New York Giants and Yankees seem to 
bring New York a championship every two 
or three years and when was the last time 
the Patriots were not a Super Bowl favorite 
for Boston and New England as a whole. 
Sympathetic tendencies certainly created 
excitement for Cleveland across the nation, 
but the question is: how can winning im­
pact more than just the emotional aspects 
of society? What are the economic assets 
a star-caliber player can bring to a city 
through what I term “winonomics”?
Winonomics is my theory that a high­
ly successful team or All-Star level play­
er can improve the economy of a team’s 
hometown and general surrounding area. 
People are more likely to want to watch a 
team that is a title-contender or has a future 
Hall of Famer on the roster than a team that 
will struggle to win half its games. Conse­
quently when more people want to watch 
the team, I predict game attendance will 
increase, which will increase ticket sales,
whose revenue can bolster an economy. 
What follows is an analysis of the credibil­
ity and reality of winonomics.
A safe assumption to make is that when 
a team signs a really talented player, the 
team will get better. This is not to say that 
the team will necessarily become a better 
team in reality, but most people will antic­
ipate a high winning percentage. The per­
fect example is the 2012-2013 season for 
the Los Angeles Lakers. After acquiring 
All-Stars Steve Nash and Dwight Howard, 
the Lakers were a favorite to win the NBA 
Finals. Nevertheless, the underwhelming 
team barely made it to the playoffs and was 
swept in the first round. Even though the 
Lakers season ended up being a disappoint­
ment, fans and sports analysts expected the 
Lakers to win because the perception was 
that their lineup had improved.
For the Cleveland Cavaliers, the great­
est improvement in the organization’s line­
up has been LeBron James. From 2001 to
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2003, Cavaliers average home game atten­
dance never reached 16,000. In the 2002- 
2003 season preceding LeBron’s rookie 
year, Cavalier game-attendance was worst 
in the league, at 11,496 attendees per home 
game.2 The Cavs measly .207 winning 
percentage (their lowest percentage since 
the early 80s) meant disappointment for 
the season, but this changed after James 
was drafted in 2003. Selected first overall 
from St. Vincent-St. Mary High School in 
Akron, Ohio, LeBron James was poised to 
revolutionize his hometown’s basketball 
team.
The Cavs entered the 21st Century as 
a competitive basketball team in 2004, 
with the emergence of LeBron’s stardom. 
In his rookie season, LeBron pushed the 
Cavs winning percentage up more than 200 
points to a .427 winning percentage.3 Then 
in his sophomore season, the 27.2 points 
and 7.4 rebounds per game he averaged led 
Cleveland to its first winning season since 
1997-1998.4 From 2004 to 2010, average 
game attendance in the Q was consistently 
over 18,000, breaking the 20,000-landmark 
in 2007.5 This rise in attendance correlated 
directly with the Cavs’ success. The era of 
LeBron dominance saw Cleveland reach 
the playoffs five times and the finals once. 
Although they never won a finals champi­
onship, fans were encouraged by the con­
tinued success of the team in the regular 
season.
It is safe to assume that the rise in 
game attendance was a result of the skills 
of the Cavaliers in this time period. LeB­
ron’s reign as “the King” including an 
abundance of accolades such as Rookie of 
the Year and MVP made the Cavs a con­
tender in the Eastern conference. With title 
contention came success, and with success 
came increases in game attendance. From 
2003, LeBron’s rookie season, to 2009, 
his final year in Cleveland, Cavs average 
game attendance increased from 11,4966 
to 20,0 1 07, a 74 percent increase. Accord­
ing to Statista.com, average ticket price in 
this era was about 50 dollars.8 This statistic 
reveals that in 2009, there were 425,700 
more dollars in the Cleveland economy 
than in 2003. Although at first glance this 
number may not seem too great in terms 
of a hundred billion dollar economy, one 
must also account for the subsequent ad­
vertisements, jersey sales, popularity of 
sports bars, and much more. There is an in­
tangible, but noticeable effect on an econ­
omy when a sports team is successful, and 
Cleveland took notice of this effect as the 
Cavaliers certainly contributed to the city’s 
GDP growth.9
Thus, when LeBron James left Cleve­
land he took more than just his talents with 
him to South Beach: he took a portion of 
the Cleveland economy. It is similar to the 
idea of job outsourcing. The claim that 
globalization of the American economy 
outsources jobs to foreign economies and 
consequently hurts the domestic economy 
because jobs at home are lost is comparable 
to when a star player like LeBron leaves 
for another team. He takes his successes, 
winning, and subsequent increases in game 
attendance to the other city. After LeBron 
joined the Heat, Miami’s rank in terms of 
average home game attendance rose from 
15th to 5th.10 The success of the Cavs was 
outsourced to Miami in 2010, because even 
though basketball may be a team sport, 
LeBron was the main reason for the Cavs 
success. In the following years, as “the 
Big Three” consisting of All-Stars LeBron 
James, Dwyane Wade, and Chris Bosh won 
two NBA championships for the Miami 
Heat, the Cavs floundered failing to be a 
.500 team for the next few years. As their 
winning record declined, so did their game 
attendance, as average home game atten­
dance dropped below 16,000."
Game attendance remained low until
the 2014-2015 season, otherwise known as 
“The Return.” After four seasons in Miami, 
LeBron decided to embark upon a home­
coming journey and bring Cleveland the 
championship that had eluded the city for 
50 years. As LeBron commenced his quest 
for redemption, Clevelanders responded to 
the return of their star player with expec­
tations of greatness for the Cavs. A rise in 
home game attendance followed in which 
during the 2014-2015 and 2015-2016 sea­
sons the Cavs had the second highest aver­
age home game attendance among all NBA 
teams, at over 20,000 people per game.12
Now we are here in the 2016-2017 
season with the seemingly eternal-drought 
ending at 52 years. As LeBron continues to 
play for the Cavs and possibly lead them to 
more championships, Cavaliers’ game at­
tendance will continue to rise above 20,000 
and have the same effects on the Cleveland 
economy that there was in the 2000s.
Although there is disagreement as to how 
much of an effect LeBron has had on the 
Cleveland economy, many agree that there 
is at least a positive effect. In fact, some 
proponents of the so-called “LeBron James 
Effect” claim that LeBron James’ return to 
Cleveland could have increased Northeast 
Ohio’s economic value by $500 million.13 
Although that number is almost certain­
ly over-exaggerated, Cleveland began to 
feel the effects of LeBron’s return almost
Average ticket price Cleveland Cavaliers games of the NBA from 2006/07 to 
2015/16 (in U.S. dollars)
2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16
Source: Additional Information
Cavaliers game ticket prices averaged about $50 from 2006 to 2016.
Graphic courtesy of Statista.com
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“This trend suggests that 
small markets are more 
volatile in relation to the 
skill of their teams than 
larger markets, specifically 
in the NBA.”
instantaneously as bar owners reported rev­
enue increases between 30 and 200 percent 
on game nights after the return.14
An interesting phenomenon surround­
ing this point concerns the locations where 
a star player can have the greatest impact 
on an economy, at least in terms of ticket 
sales and game attendance. Cleveland is 
certainly a city, but by no means is it the 
size of New York, Chicago, or Los Angeles. 
While Cleveland was on the rise and then 
on the decline and now on the rise again, 
huge markets such as Chicago, New York, 
and Los Angeles have remained among 
the top of the league in game attendance. 
Granted the Lakers had Kobe and the Bulls 
were consistently making the playoffs, but 
both teams have definitely had their strug­
gles with winning as of late. Additionally, 
the Knicks have only made the playoffs 
four times since the 2001-2002 season, but 
attendance at Madison Square Garden has 
remained towards the top of the league.15
Unlike the big markets, in a small market 
economy such as Cleveland, the success of
a big name player was able to significantly 
affect game attendance. The same trend has 
occurred in other small market economies 
such as Detroit. While making the playoffs 
for eight consecutive seasons from 2001 
to 2008 under the leadership of Chaunc- 
ey Billups and Ben Wallace, Pistons home 
game attendance topped the league for 
many years at about 20,000.16 But follow­
ing the 2008-2009 season, Pistons average 
home game attendance has continued to 
drop alongside their losing seasons, sitting 
25th in game attendance this past year even 
though they did make the playoffs (losing 
in the first round to LeBron and the Cavs). 
These small markets cannot seem to sustain 
high game attendance in the absence of star 
players.
This trend suggests that small markets 
are more volatile in relation to the skill of 
their teams than larger markets, specifical­
ly in the NBA. Perhaps larger markets con­
sist of fans with high enough salaries that 
allow them to attend basketball games no 
matter how good or bad the team is, while 
in smaller markets, fans with less money to 
spend choose to only pay for games when 
they’ll be watching a skilled team. Or per­
haps, in larger markets, basketball teams 
are a more ingrained part of the community 
than in smaller markets so in larger markets 
people will pay to watch games without 
regard to the team’s record. These are cer­
tainly only conjectures as to explain these
trends, but nevertheless winonomics seems 
to hold true for Clevelanders.
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In the 2013-14 offseason, former All-Star center fielder Jacoby Ellsbury signed with the
Yankees in free agency for $153 million over 7 years.
Photo courtesy of Newsday
Too Big to 
Fail:
Why the New 
York Yankees 
Will Always be 
Contenders
Sam Schwartz ‘18
Each year, the MLB witnesses several 
brand new forces that emerge as legitimate 
candidates to win the World Series. Of 
course, there are those few dynasties that 
appear to compete an annual basis, such as 
the Boston Red Sox, the St. Louis Cardi­
nals and the New York Yankees. Thrown 
into the mix, however, are some new young 
faces on emerging franchises, eager to win 
their first World Series of their career. After 
years of losing and suffering, the Cleveland 
Indians and the Chicago Cubs have used 
the 2016 season to deeply entrench them­
selves into a legitimate postseason run, and 
their efforts have marvelously set these 
franchises up for a bright future.
But what does a “bright future” mean 
exactly? Live years of continued success, 
maybe seven years if a team gets lucky. 
But then what? Do they slowly fall back 
into their losing ways? After all, when all 
of their young players -  the ones who took 
them so far year after year -  start to get 
old after five or so years, they either start 
to break down physically or depart via free 
agency or trade. At that point, the franchise 
can gradually fall apart year after year until 
they turn into the 2016 Cincinnati Reds or 
Tampa Bay Rays.
The same way it is not always perfect 
for up-and-coming franchises, it may not 
always be as gloomy for basement dwellers 
either. After all, once a franchise realizes its 
team’s performance is no longer competi­
tive, it can simply deal their semi-valuable
player assets in exchange for prospects 
who should succeed in the coming years. 
This, along with the fact that the franchise 
losing now can lead to higher draft picks 
in the coming years, sets the franchise up 
for a bright future. Or rather, a “bright fu­
ture”. Look at 2016’s Philadelphia Phillies 
or Atlanta Braves as examples. While both 
teams have had horrific performances in 
the 2016 season, their farm systems have 
substantially grown and their major-league 
rosters have witnessed several young excit­
ing rookies that will only continue to devel­
op into quality athletes.
Think about all the teams that have 
talented rosters today. Now think about 
how they were six years 
ago. The young Indians 
and Cubs are prime exam­
ples, but other top teams 
such as the Washington 
Nationals, the New York 
Mets, and the Los Angeles 
Dodgers all have one thing 
in common: they all fin­
ished with a record under 
.500 in 2010. Meanwhile, 
think about some of the 
teams that have dominated 
back in 2010. Some of these teams would 
include the now-lowly Phillies, Reds, Rays 
and Braves.1
The cyclical nature of baseball franchi­
sees is no new concept, and it is not fool­
proof either. As mentioned before, the dy­
nasties were still competitive six years ago, 
and even further before then. Intertwined 
with all their success, however, the Cardi­
nals have had quite a few mediocre years, 
and the Red Sox recently had several last 
place finishes in the AL East.
So why does all this rhetoric regard­
ing past and present success even matter? 
Against all odds, there is one sole franchise 
in the MLB that does anything it can to defy 
the cyclical nature of baseball: The New 
York Yankees. Now, this is not to insinuate 
that the Bronx Bombers have been success­
ful each and every year; no team has been. 
However, the actions of the Yankees’ 
front office throughout the past five 
years have shown that no matter their 
current roster construction, they will 
commit financially whatever it takes 
to put a winner on the field today.
On the surface, this seems to be 
a desirable plan. After all, who likes 
losing? If there is a way of going 
for success for now, each and every 
year, then any logical general man­
ager (GM) would pursue this avenue. 
And that’s exactly what Yankees GM 
Brian Cashman went for in the 2013-2014 
offseason.
After missing the playoffs for the 2nd 
time in 19 seasons, the Yankees faithful
“In essence, 
the Yankees 
owners’ 
objective 
is to maintain 
their brand’s 
elite 
status.”
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could tell that this franchise was taking a 
turn for the worse.2 They just lost future 
Hall-of-Fame closer Mariano Rivera and 
long-time stud starting pitcher Andy Pettitte 
to retirement, troubled third baseman Alex 
Rodriguez to a season-long suspension for 
performance enhancing drugs, and peren­
nial All-Star second baseman Robinson 
Cano to free agency. Former All-Stars such 
as Derek Jeter, Curtis Granderson, Kevin 
Youkilis, Mark Teixeira, and CC Sabathia 
performed horrendously and were rapidly 
aging (the latter two were also locked into 
multi-year overpaid contracts). Their farm 
system was among the worst in the league, 
and provided no immediate incoming help. 
Worst of all, the best players on their ros­
ter returning for 2014 were Ivan Nova and 
Brett Gardner, neither of whom were close 
to being All-Stars.
Most other franchises would have start­
ed the rebuilding process the year before, 
foreseeing this nightmare and stopping 
the bleeding before it even started. Then 
again, most other franchises do not have a 
$555,000,000 band-aid to patch it up. That 
number is no typo. The Yankees spent over 
a half a billion dollars in the 2013-2014 off­
season, re-signing Jeter and solid starting 
pitcher Hiroki Kuroda while adding All- 
Star caliber players such as Japanese sen­
sation Masahiro Tanaka, outfielders Carlos 
Beltran and Jacoby Ellsbury, and catcher 
Brian McCann.2 It was by far the biggest 
spending spree in MLB history, and even 
with it, the Yankees were far from World
Yankees general manager Brian Cashman 
has recently traded away several high- 
profile players to bolster the Yankees' young 
growing core.
Photo courtesy of Newsday
Series favorites, let alone division favor­
ites. Unsurprisingly, the Yankees have still 
failed to win the division since that offsea­
son, confirming the widespread notion that 
franchisees cannot be fixed through free 
agency.
So why did they even bother trying? 
Why did they avoid the same cyclical 
model that almost every other MLB team 
endures at some point, many of whom en­
dured throughout the past 15 years? They 
knew that their strong core they had in the 
past decade were all aging rapidly or retir­
ing, and yet they refused to accept defeat 
for a few years so that they could groom 
a brand new core of prospects to build 
around.
Simply put, the Yankees business mod­
el precedes the Yankees roster construc­
tion. At the end of the day, all organiza­
tions in professional sports are businesses, 
and they are all turn large profits for their 
owners, one way or another. These owners 
can have different philosophies regarding 
their business; some are willing to expend 
all resources necessary (within reason) to 
bring a championship to a city whenever 
possible, while others aim to maximize 
profit through various profit streams, which 
also includes providing a winner for fans to 
come to the ballpark to watch.
For the Yankees ownership group, 
their primary objective appears to be a bit 
unique and customized for their situation. 
The New York Yankees organization has a 
longstanding history as the greatest fran­
chise in American sports, with 27 cham­
pionships on its resume. Additionally, the 
Bronx Bombers are perennially among the 
world’s most valuable sports franchises 
and have the reputation for not only being 
a symbol of America, but a symbol of win­
ning and success.
In essence, the Yankees owners’ objec­
tive is to maintain their brand’s elite status. 
No other city in the world creates more 
competition for entertainment industries 
than New York City, so the Yankees want 
to ensure their loyal, primarily wealthy 
fan base and incoming tourists around the 
world that when people pay the (enormous) 
price of admission to New Yankee Stadi­
um, they should expect to see a winner 
and receive their money’s worth. Any los­
ing season could create a negative stigma 
that may dissuade people from committing 
their time and money to this franchise.
This elite standard is the standard that the
Yankees have held themselves for decades, 
and it is clear through the Yankees’ spend­
ing pattern that no amount of money is not 
worth risking to save this reputation.
Times have certainly changed for the 
Yankees organization. Several clever 
trades along with breakout performances 
from multiple young players and prospects 
within the Yankees organization have posi­
tioned New York with one of the best farm 
systems in the MLB, if not the best. Team 
spending on player salaries have gone down 
year by year, and this offseason represents 
a major turning point for this franchise.
It’s an exciting time for the Yankees 
faithful, as they could be on the cusp of a 
brand-new Yankees core that could com­
bine with the ownership’s wealth to com­
pose the next era of winning baseball in the 
Bronx. Despite this, the fact remain that 
this team has no intention to slow down 
on their spending, regardless of their roster 
construction. As long as the Yankees own­
ership continue to strive to preserve their 
brand image -  and the MLB salary cap 
remains the same -  the Yankees will sus­
tain their hold as one of the most dominant 
sporting franchises in America.
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Free Agency Frenzy
Ben Gershenfeld ‘19
In 2016, it is completely valid to judge the 
effect of a moment by its corresponding re­
action on Twitter. On July 4th, 2016, a day 
where most of the Tweets are composed to 
celebrate America’s independence, Kevin 
Durant’s announcement of his decision to 
join the Golden State Warriors shook the 
Twitter (and real) world, becoming one of 
the most talked about moments of 2016. His 
declaration to join an already historic team 
as a free agent was historic, as evidenced 
by its 66,000 “retweets” and countless re­
actions by celebrities, fans, and players of 
the NBA.1 However, Durant’s free agency 
move from Oklahoma City to the Bay Area 
is not an isolated incident of NBA players 
dominating the news cycle with a decision 
to switch teams; LeBron James to Miami 
in 2010, LeBron James returning back to 
Cleveland in 2014, and Dwight Howard 
fleeing Los Angeles for Houston in 2013 
forced sports radio and television into a 
24-hour conversation centered around the 
NBA for weeks at a time. With four major 
sports battling for eyeballs and good pub­
licity in America, headlines and conver­
sation are important, and few things keep 
leagues relevant in their respective off-sea­
sons more than free agency. Because of the 
different structure of contracts, the NBA 
has a far more intriguing free agency peri­
od than the NFL, MLB, or NHL. Not only 
does this help the league remain relevant 
twelve months throughout the year, but 
the fluid free agency that the NBA offers 
significantly affects the local economies of 
cities and teams in the league.
One of the more interesting subplots of 
the NBA free agency splash this past sum­
mer was the reaction from other American 
athletes. NFL players showed envy of their 
fellow American athletes signing these his­
torically large contracts in whichever city 
they desired. Emmanuel Sanders, wide 
receiver for the Denver Broncos, tweeted 
“Looks like I chose the wrong sport #NBA- 
FreeAgency.”2 Will Compton, linebacker 
for Washington’s NFL team, summed it up 
best, tweeting “How does the NBA...have 
such a better player contract situation than 
the NFL?? These deals are insane”.3 Free
agency is a miracle to employees across 
the country, let alone major athletes. The 
prospect of choosing where to work and 
being able to use free market forces to have 
several organizations bidding for your ser­
vices is a dream for any worker. Due to 
certain contract stipulations agreed upon 
by leagues and their players’ unions, the 
NBA allows for much more high-profile 
free agency than the NFL, MLB, or NHL.
The main reason why free agency in 
the NFL is so different than in the NBA is 
because of the short playing careers of NFL 
players. According to the site Statista4, 
NFL players on average only play for about 
3.3 years. Out of just the players who make 
a team’s opening day roster in their rookie 
years, which fleshes out less noteworthy 
players who may dilute the statistic, the 
average career spans only 6 years.5 Short 
playing careers can be attributed to the 
bevy of injuries that players aggregate over 
their careers due to the especially physical 
nature of football. High-profile free agency 
requires organizations to make long-term 
bets on players in terms of years of employ­
ment and salary. After drafted players fin­
ish their rookie contracts, few players can 
convince teams to invest millions of dollars 
and a guaranteed roster spot to a “used” 
player. But it is not just the teams that have 
the leverage. Few NFL players want to en­
ter free agency for the fear of being with­
out a contract. Players, like organizations,
know that a brutal hit can come at any time, 
and they want to gather as much insurance 
as possible, securing as much money and 
contractual longevity as possible. Some of 
today’s most accomplished and seasoned 
veterans, like Tom Brady, Eli Manning, 
and Philip Rivers, to name a few, have nev­
er entered free agency. They have signed 
multi-million dollar extensions while still 
under contract to ensure that they never left 
themselves without a contract. In contrast, 
injuries are much less of a worry for NBA 
players, and long playing careers are often 
accomplished. LeBron James, Kevin Du­
rant, and Carmelo Anthony have all gone 
through highly anticipated free agency, 
while the aforementioned faces of the NFL 
have not even tested free agency. LeBron 
James continues to sign short-term deals in 
order to sign a bigger contract each year or 
two, deeming a career-threatening injury 
unlikely. With players and franchises more 
willing to invest in the future of a player’s 
career in the NBA than in the NFL, NBA 
free agency becomes much more high-pro­
file and intriguing.
The other aspect that separates NBA 
free agency from the other major sports is 
the structure of contracts agreed upon by 
the Collective Bargaining Agreements in 
each sport. While the NBA, NHL, and 
MLB all have required rookie contracts 
that keep a player on the team that draft­
ed him for 3-5 years,6 the leagues differ in
Kevin Durant being introduced as the newest Golden State Warrior at a press conference
Photo courtesy of CSN Bay Area
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their contract requirements past the rookie 
deal. In baseball, the game’s most visible 
stars regularly sign massive contracts in 
terms of both money and years. Giancar- 
lo Stanton, one of the game’s best young 
players, signed a contract in 2015 that will 
last for 13 years and pay $325 million. Al­
bert Pujols, one of this generation’s most 
recognizable players, signed a 10-year 
contract worth $240 million in 2012, and 
he was already 32 years old! Similarly in 
the NHL, while the money is not nearly as 
abundant as in the MLB, the spans of con­
tracts remain just as long. Sidney Crosby 
never even explored free agency, as he was 
able to secure a 12-year extension to his 
previous deal in 2012.7 His fellow All-Star 
and captain Jonathan Toews also has inked 
back-to-back long term deals, capping it 
off with an 8-year deal signed this past sea­
son which has kept him from exploring free 
agency as well. The NBA contract struc­
ture, however, only allows a player to sign 
a deal with a team for a maximum of 4-5 
years. With the top players coming into the 
league as young as 19 years old, they have 
the ability to hit free agency multiple times 
before the end of their careers. In fact, Du­
rant signed this past summer for 2 years, 
while James signed a contract for 3 years.8 
Long deals keep players off the markets for 
several years, and while there are always 
free agents in the MLB and NHL, there is 
rarely a free agent frenzy like the NBA of­
fers yearly. Before we know it, the sport’s
most prolific players and personalities will 
be back on the free agency market domi­
nating headlines and news cycles.
When a new player enters a new city, 
merchandise sales, ticket sales, vending, 
local restaurants, and local television rat­
ings all improve dramatically. On July 26, 
2016, a mere 3 weeks after Durant’s sign­
ing with the Golden State Warriors, Alex 
Kennedy of ClutchPoints reported that Du­
rant’s new Warriors jerseys were the lead­
ing seller in 30 states, including in Oklaho­
ma City, the place he fled.9 However, for 
the 2015-16 season before Durant entered 
free agency, his jersey sold just the 8th 
highest in the NBA.10 As Durant elected 
to switch teams, stores across the country, 
and most drastically in the Bay Area, saw a 
noticeable spike in sales related to his mer­
chandise. Free agency also affects stadium 
attendance. Between 2011 and 2014, the 
Cleveland Cavaliers averaged about 16,000 
fans per home game at Quicken Loans Are­
na." After LeBron reunited with the Cavs 
after the 2014 season, the Cavaliers aver­
aged 20,562 fans per game for the next two 
seasons, which happens to be the arena’s 
maximum capacity.12 Yes, other players 
were brought to the city, but LeBron James 
deserves to be credited with a 4,000 fan 
increase in attendance per game, which is 
possible because of high-profile free agen­
cy. With the increase in game attendance 
comes an increase in economic activity for 
local areas. According to Business Insider,
“Bar owners near the arena have seen a 30- 
200% increase in revenue on game nights. 
Bartenders and waitresses that would nor­
mally be laid off until the summer are being 
kept on the payroll.”13 And while in the sal­
ary cap-less MLB, it is typically the same 
teams signing marquee free agents, like the 
Red Sox, Dodgers, and Yankees, the NBA 
has a salary cap that allows all teams to bid 
for the biggest names on the market and 
their respective cities to get the economic 
bump.
The changes that these teams under­
go, both in economics and popularity, stem 
from an improvement in performance, but 
it is the speed in which NBA teams can 
change tiers that sets the league apart. For 
reasons such as contract structure and ca­
reer lengths, the NBA has fostered a much 
different free agency system than the oth­
er 3 major American sports, and its effect 
does not only appear on the court, but also 
in the local economies across the country.
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Letter From the President
As an undergraduate student organization dedicated to educating and preparing its 
members, from across the entire university, for career opportunities in the sports industry, 
the Cornell ILR Sports Business Society is one of the premier student-run sports business 
organizations in the country. The club aims to reach this mission through the club’s four 
main platforms: speaker events, blog, magazine, and radio program. This year our club 
featured 14 executive board members and added a new research department. The club 
has a general body meeting every other week. Typically, these meetings incorporate de­
bates on issues in the sports business world or career spotlight presentations. Many club 
members attended the Michigan Sports Business Conference in November and the club 
is planning a trip to the MIT Sloan Sports Analytics Conference. In the future, we hope to 
hold a networking conference of similar proportion. The club also hopes to modernize its 
website and social media presence.
Content production has been and continues to be one of the club’s main goals. I am 
happy to report that our blog is more active than ever before, featuring weekly blogger 
roundtable discussions on our club website. Furthermore, our Sports Inc. magazine is pro­
duced on a bi-annual basis and features a wide range of stories about current sports topics. 
The SBS Report is produced every week and broadcasted through Cornell Radio. Finally, 
the club is grateful to all alumni and other professionals who have taken the time to visit 
campus or Skype with us throughout the semester. This year we were lucky to have the 
likes of Ted Sullivan, Josh Frost, Molly West, Rich Lerner, Ron Klemper, Scott Malaga, 
and Tim McGhee speak with the club. We are very fortunate that our alumni have been 
more than happy to be involved with the Sports Business Society as there is no better way 
to learn about the industry. With the diverse and extensive alumni network that is willing 
to support our group, we hope to add value to their own career advancement by connecting 
them with the rest of Cornell’s community.
The Cornell ILR Sports Business Society strives to serve both our student’s and 
alumni’s passion for sports business. Cornell is perhaps the most respected name within 
the Sports industry. The club hopes to continue and grow that reputation in the years to 
come.
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